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Abstract 
This paper presents an analysis of the degree of de facto exchange rate flexibility in the exchange rate regimes for 
selected emerging Asian economies over the decade 1999-2009. While the propensity for foreign exchange 
intervention and exchange rate management among regional central banks remains fairly high in many cases and that 
the degree of fixity to the US dollar remains very strong, we note that these relationships correlate to some extent with 
the IMF exchange rate classifications. Specifically, we find that the inflation targeting countries exhibit less fixity and 
are less influenced by the US dollar than the non-inflation targeters. We also find that the managed floaters (as defined 
by the IMF) exhibit less fixity and are less influenced by the US dollar than the conventional peggers.
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1.  Motivation 
An  enduring  question  in  the  literature  on  exchange  rate  regimes  is:  how  do  official 
classifications  compare  with  de  facto  regimes?  This  paper  facilitates  this  comparison  by 
presenting an analysis of the degree of de facto exchange rate flexibility in the exchange rate 
regimes  for  emerging  Asian  economies,  viz.  Bangladesh,  China,  India,  Indonesia,  Korea, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam over the decade 
1999 – 2009.  We do this by employing one of the available and well-known methods -- the 
Frankel-Wei (Frankel and Wei, 1994, 2007) methodology. The basic objective of this paper is to 
draw inferences about regime classification from the Frankel-Wei estimates and then evaluate 
these with official and IMF exchange rate regime classifications.  
Table 1 presents the official and unofficial exchange rate classifications.
 1 The second 
column  of  Table  1  shows  the  official  exchange  rate  classification,  and  the  third  column 
categorizes Asian exchange rates based on the IMF classifications as of July 2006. From the 
comparison within Table 1 we see that India and Singapore are categorized as managed floaters, 
broadly  consistent  with  their  official  pronouncements.  Vietnam,  which  used  to  be  in  this 
category,  has  more  recently  been  classified  as  having  a  conventional  fixed  peg  regime,  in 
contrast to its official pronouncement of maintaining a crawling peg and band around the US 
dollar. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are characterized as fixers despite their official declarations of 
being independent floaters. Pakistan is defined as a managed floater despite proclaiming to be an 
independent  floater.  Korea  and  the  Philippines  are  characterized  as  independent  floaters, 
consistent with their official assertions that they are inflation targeters. Indonesia and Thailand, 
which are officially inflation targeters, are classified as managed floaters.  Contrary to the public 
pronouncement that the Chinese currency is a crawling peg, the IMF classifies China under 
“other  conventional  fixed peg  arrangements”.  The  Malaysian  ringgit  is  defined  as  being  a 
managed floater with no predetermined path. Clearly Asia appears to be home to a wide array of 
exchange rate regimes. 
 
2.  De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes 
This section presents a measure that has been recently used in Frankel and Wei (2007) as 
a way of incorporating exchange rate regime flexibility (or fixity) into the original Frankel and 
Wei (1994) method for inferring implicit basket weights.  Consider the following: 
 
Intervention_Index  = Δe + Δr              (1)
2 
                                                           
1 Between  1975  and  1998  the  IMF’s  Annual  Report  on  Exchange  Arrangements  and  Exchange 
Restrictions was based on self-reporting of national policies by various governments with revisions in 
1977 and 1982. Since 1998 the IMF’s exchange rate classification methodology has shifted to compiling 
unofficial  policies  of  countries  as  determined  by  Fund  staff  based  on  various  sources,  including 
information from IMF staff, press reports, other relevant papers, as well as the behaviour of bilateral 
nominal  exchange  rates  and  reserves.  (see  Bubula  and  Ötker-Robe  (2002)  which  appears  to  be  the 
intellectual basis for the IMF de facto regimes). Since the IMF is no longer compiling the de jure regimes. 
The only way this can be done is by referring to the website of each central bank or other national sources 
individually and wading through relevant materials. 
 
2 This is the same index used by Frankel and Wei. However, they use the term “EMP index” as opposed 
to  “Intervention  index”.  The  use  of  the  first  term  can  be  confusing  as  the  index  used  is  not  the 
conventional exchange market pressure (EMP) index commonly used in the literature. 
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where  Δe,  is  defined  as  the  (log  difference  of  the)  local  currency  per  some  independent 
numeraire – here we use the SDR
3 and Δr is the monthly change in net foreign assets (IFS line 
11 – line 16c) scaled by lagged money base (line 14).
4 To see how eq. (1) relates to the choice of 
exchange rate regime we need to use an Intervention_Index to augment the original Frankel-Wei 
method as follows: 
   
Δet = α0 + α1 ΔUSt + α2 ΔJPt + α3 ΔEUt  + γ Intervention_Index + μt    (2) 
 
The α coefficients in equation (2) are often interpreted as implicit currency weights. The 
G3 currencies (in log differences) of USD, euro and the yen (all per the SDR) are chosen as they 
represent world currencies deemed to exert sufficient influence on the local currency. While it is 
tempting to interpret these coefficients as potential basket weights, it is probably more prudent 
for them to be interpreted as “degrees of influence” as it is very difficult to say whether a high 
and  significant  coefficient  value  implies  a  basket  currency,  or  merely  market  driven 
correlations.
5  
Under equation (2), as γ → 1 the exchange rate per local currency becomes more flexible 
as the Intervention_Index converges to the dependent variable, Δe and the α coefficients should 
be close to zero and/or statistically insignificant. As γ → 0 the exchange rate becomes more fixed 
and the extent of fixity to various major currencies is captured by the α coefficients.
6  
 
2.1  Estimates by Country 
We use monthly data for the period for the period 1999:m2 and 2009:m9 or some sub-
periods thereof depending on data.
7 Table 2 presents OLS results. Two samples are presented for 
                                                           
3 The idea behind using the SDR revolves around finding a currency that is not excessively related to any 
of the currencies used in this study. A common choice in this literature has often been the Swiss franc, but 
there are concerns that its strong correlation with the euro may bias parameter estimates.  
 
4 Reserve differences are scaled by lagged domestic monetary base in order to compare the magnitude of 
the reserve change in relation to the stock of money base in the system. The result is an index that is more 
easily interpretable than if absolute values are taken.  
 
5 It is also for this reason that we did not impose the restriction that all the currency weights should add up 
to one or for that matter why we do not just restrict the parameters to take values in between 0 and 1 (as 
there may be more complex correlations that we might know about a priori). 
 
6 In our estimations we do not impose any constraints on the γ coefficient, thus it could exceed one or be 
negative. 
 
7 Two caveats should be noted. One, we prefer lower frequency data in terms of month-to-month changes 
as there is too much noise in low frequency data (day -to-day or month-to-month). High frequency data 
tends to tell us more about ad hoc interventions to minimize volatilities as opposed to degrees of influence 
of G3 currencies. In addition, the data on reserves are only available on a monthly basis so there is a 
practical dimension to our choice as well. Two, reserve values could change because of currency 
fluctuations and ideally we should exclude these effects before estimation. However, this is not possible 
since we lack data on the currency composition of reserves`. This may impact the precision of the results 
in some cases.     3 
each country – one including and one excluding the final two years of the sample where results 
may reveal the effect of the recent global crisis.
8 
By and large the USD is the currency that has the greatest degree of influence on the 
local currency. Results do not change much when we truncate the sample to the pre-global crisis 
period with the exceptions of Korea and India, the two countries initially impacted by a reversal  
of global capital flows. In essence both central banks allowed much greater exchange rate 
flexibility during the crisis and this shows up in terms of much higher USD eights pre-crisis. 
With the exceptions of Korea and Malaysia, Pakistan and Vietnam, the Intervention index 
is statistically significant and therefore open to interpretation. The values are all under 0.1 in the 
cases of China, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand and close to 0 in many cases, 
suggesting there exists a high deal of fixity in the local currencies (vis-a-vis a single currency or 
basket of major currencies).
9 The Intervention index has a slightly stronger economic weight in 
Indonesia and India, suggesting these two economies allowed relatively greater exchange rate 
flexibility than the others. The pertinent question here is to what extent are these weights market-
driven versus policy targets?  
We can attempt to answer this by summarizing the interaction between the currency 
weights and the Intervention index. We focus first on those currencies with Intervention indices 
that are at or close to zero and are statistically significant. The Chinese case is the most clear-cut 
with the USD weight at 1, implying continued heavy exchange rate management.
10 The USD 
weights for the Bangladesh taka, Sri Lankan rupee and the Philippine peso are surprisingly large 
(0.9 and 0.8, respectively), suggesting a high degree of fixity. While this is consistent with the 
IMF’s  categorization  of  Sri  Lanka  and  Bangladesh  as  both  having  conventional  fixed  peg 
arrangements,  it  is  at  clear  odds  with  the  Philippines  being  described  as  operating  an 
“independent  floating”  arrangement.  Thailand  and  Singapore  also  have  low  and  statistically 
significant  Intervention  indices  but  with  far  lower  USD  weights  and  some  positive  and 
statistically significant weight to other currencies. This is indicative of management against a 
currency  basket,  consistent  with  the  official  proclamations  by  the  Monetary  Authority  of 
Singapore (MAS) as well as an often-noted desire for currency basket pegging by the Bank of 
Thailand (BOT). Both are broadly defined by the IMF as being managed floaters.
11  
Two other  currencies characterized as managed floaters by  the  IMF  are  India and 
Indonesia. As noted, both have relatively higher In tervention indices, suggestive of a greater 
degree of exchange rate flexibilit y. The currency weights for Indonesia suggest it is market -
driven as the α coefficients are either statistically insignificant (USD and euro) or zero / negative 
(yen). The  Indian  rupee appears to  have  a  degree of  flexibility in  the  exchange rate with  a 
possible loose US dollar peg. The Intervention index measures for Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan are 
all statistically insignificant, implying there is insufficient evidence from the Intervention index 
coefficient to suggest the existence of any systematic exchange rate fixity over the sample period 
under consideration. However, examining the α coefficients one notes a high degree of influence 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
8 Time dummies were also used with little success. As such, we decided that presenting two sets of results 
will show more explicitly the effect of the crisis on the exchange rate.  
 
10 The weight on the USD decline marginally if we consider the sub-period from 2006.  
 
11 However, the lack of statistical significance of the non-USD currencies is odd. 
   4 
of  the  USD  and  non-existent  influence  of  the  other  currencies  for  Malaysia  and  Pakistan, 
suggesting that both countries manage their currencies against the USD.  
 
2.2  Estimates by Regime Type 
Thus  far  we  have  generated  estimates  of  the  Frankel-Wei  equation  for  individual 
countries.  An interesting question relates to how clusters of “like” countries fare relative to each 
other.  In  other  words,  what  are  the  estimated  USD  and  intervention  index  coefficients  for 
countries that are managed floaters under the IMF classifications, for instance, versus those are 
supposed to have a conventional fixed regime or are independently floating? Or how do the 
coefficients compare for those countries that formally declare themselves as inflation targeters? 
Table  3  present  fixed  effects  estimates  for  several  panel  data  series  with  each  panel 
representing a regime type.  The first and second columns of results present the estimates for the 
inflation targeters (Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand) versus the remainder of the 
sample. The results show that the USD coefficient is lower and the intervention index coefficient 
is  higher  for  the  inflation  targeting  countries.  This  is  broadly  consistent  with  the  normative 
literature on inflation targeting where a (more) flexible exchange rate is preferred under that 
regime. Moreover, the R-sq is lower which is also reasonable to expect a priori as the nature of 
the estimates are such that they are deigned to uncover fixity.  
The final 3 columns of results show the estimates for countries as grouped by the IMF de 
facto classifications – independently floating (Korea, the Philippines), managed floating (India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, Thailand) and conventional  fixed (Bangladesh,  Sri 
Lanka, Vietnam).
12  As with the inflation targeting results, the USD coefficient increases with 
the degree of (IMF de facto) fixity, though the USD coefficient for the floaters is only marginally 
statistically significant (at 11 percent). The intervention index is less emphatic since the value for 
the floating group is not statistically significant and near zero.
13 If we examine the managed 
floaters versus the fixers in isolation we see that the index coefficient is lower for the fixers. This 
is consistent with the IMF regime classification. 
To further check whether there has been a change in the degree of  intervention / 
flexibility in Asia over time,  we undertake recursive least squares estimates for the US dollar 
coefficient, α1. The recursive estimates are generated by running the regression for equation (2) 
iteratively – beginning with k observations and recording the coefficient values until we reach 
the full sample.
14 Figures 1a-b show the recursive coefficients for the US dollar coefficient for 
the inflation targeting countries versus the remainder of the countries sampled  –  the  non-
inflation-targeters. Generally the influence of the US dollar is lower for the inflation targeting 
group than for the other group as would be expected a priori. Figures 2a-c suggests that the 
degree of influence of the US dollar is high across the board. While this is anticipated with the 
conventional  fixed  peggers  we  would  expect  the  US  dollar  peg  to  have  been  lower  for  the 
                                                           
12 China is omitted from this test as they are alone in being a crawling peg under the IMF classification. 
 
13 The lack of significance for this group is possibly attributable to the fact that Korea and the Philippines 
present quite different results individually. 
 
14 k is the number of regressors. Due to insufficient degrees of freedom we discard the first few coefficient 
values – about 3 years worth.  Recursive OLS is a special case of the Kalman Filter modeling strategy 
with  time-varying  coefficients.  These  results  are  typically  consistent  with  the  rolling  fixed  window 
regressions where one would drop the oldest observation before incorporating the most recent.     5 
floating pair of Korea and (especially) the Philippines. Figure 2b for the managed floaters is 
broadly consistent with that regime choice. The exchange rates in those countries with a lower 
US coefficient value – namely Singapore and Thailand – are also influenced by other currencies 
while the others tend to be influenced more exclusively by the US dollar. 
 
3.   Conclusion 
This paper has examined the de facto exchange rate regimes in emerging Asia. There is 
some evidence indicating a greater degree of exchange rate flexibility in the regional economies. 
However, there is still a high level of fixity to the US dollar regardless of the de jure exchange 
rate regime. While the propensity for exchange rate management in Asia remains fairly high in 
many cases and that the degree of fixity to the US dollar remains very strong, these relationships 
do correlate to some extent with both official classifications but less so with those based on the 
IMF exchange rate classifications. Consistent with our priors, we find that the inflation targeting 
countries  exhibit  less  fixity  and  are  less  influenced  by  the  US  dollar  than  the  non-inflation 
targeters. We also find that the managed floaters exhibit less fixity and are less influenced by the 
US dollar than the conventional peggers. 
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Table 1: De jure Exchange Rate Regimes in Asia  
 
Country  Official Policy Pronouncements (direct quotes)  IMF Exchange Rate 
Classifications as of 
April 2008
3 
Bangladesh  The exchange rates of the taka for inter-bank and customer 
transactions are set by the dealer banks themselves, based on 
DM  and-supply  interaction.  The  Bangladesh  Bank  is  not 
present in the market on a day-to-day basis and undertakes 
purchase or sale transactions with the dealer banks only as 
needed to maintain orderly market conditions. 
Other conventional 
fixed peg arrangement 
(against a single 
currency). 
China  China  announced  on  July  21,  2005  the  adoption  of  a 
managed  floating  exchange  rate  regime  based  on  market 
supply and DM and with reference to a basket of currencies. 
Crawling Peg 
India  The exchange rate policy in recent years has been guided by 
the broad principles of careful monitoring and management 
of exchange rates with flexibility, without a fixed target or a 
pre-announced target or a band, coupled with the ability to 
intervene if and when necessary.  
Managed floating with 
no predetermined path 
Indonesia  In  July  2005,  Bank  Indonesia  launched  a  new  monetary 
policy  framework  known  as  the  Inflation  Targeting 
Framework,…  However,  Bank  Indonesia  is  able  to  take 
some actions to keep the rupiah from undergoing excessive 
fluctuation. 
Managed floating with 
no predetermined path 
Korea  Inflation targeting is an operating framework of monetary 
policy  in  which  the  central  bank  announces  an  explicit 
inflation target and achieves its target directly… However, 
the Bank of Korea implements smoothing operations to deal 
with  abrupt  swings  in  the  exchange  rate  caused  by 
temporary  imbalances  between  supply  and  Demand,  or 
radical changes in market sentiment.  
Independently floating. 
Malaysia   On 21 July 2005, Malaysia shifted from a fixed exchange 
rate regime of USD1 = RM3.80 to a managed float against a 
basket of currencies.  
Managed floating with 
no predetermined path 
Pakistan
2  State  Bank  of  Pakistan  has  attempted  to  maintain  real 
effective  exchange  rate  at  a  level  that  keeps  the 
competitiveness  of  Pakistani  exports  intact.  [and]…  does 
intervene from time to time to keep stability in the market 
and smooth excessive fluctuations.  
Managed floating with 
no predetermined path 
Philippines  The adoption of inflation targeting framework for monetary 
policy  in  January  2002….The  Monetary  Board  … 
determines the rates at which the Bangko Sentral buys and 
sells spot exchange, and establishes deviation limits from the 
effective exchange rate or rates as it deems proper. 
Independently floating.   7 
Country  Official Policy Pronouncements (direct quotes)  IMF Exchange Rate 
Classifications as of 
April 2008
3 
Singapore  Since 1981, monetary policy in Singapore has been centred 
on the management of the exchange rate. (1) The Singapore 
dollar is managed against a basket of currencies of its major 
trading  partners  and  competitors.  (2)  The  Monetary 
Authority of Singapore operates a managed float regime for 
the Singapore dollar. The trade-weighted exchange rate is 
allowed  to  fluctuate  within  an  undisclosed  policy  band, 
rather than kept to a fixed value.  
Managed floating with 
no predetermined path 
Sri Lanka  The Central Bank continues to conduct its monetary policy 
under an independently floating exchange rate regime…  
Other conventional 
fixed peg arrangements 
(against a single 
currency). 
Thailand  Since July 2, 1997, Thailand has adopted the managed-float 
exchange  rate  regime,  …  The  Bank  of  Thailand  will 
intervene  in  the  market  only  when  necessary,  in  order  to 
prevent excessive volatilities and achieve economic policy 
targets.  Under the inflation targeting framework, the Bank 
of Thailand implements its monetary policy by influencing 
short-term money market rates…  
Managed floating with 
no predetermined path. 
Vietnam  Vietnam has adopted a crawling peg with the US dollar for 
its exchange rate.  
Other conventional 
fixed peg arrangements 




1)  Based on information available from Brunei Ministry of Finance. 
http://www.finance.gov.bn/bcb/bcb_index.htm. 
2)  Based on speech by former Pakistan central bank Governor (Husain, 2005).  
Source: Compiled by author with assistance of Nicola Virgill from websites from various central banks and 
other official sources with minor modifications. Central Bank websites available here: 
http://www.bis.org/cbanks.htm. 
3)  Source: IMF data on Classification of Exchange Rate Arrangements and Monetary Frameworks 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/er/2008/eng/0408.htm  
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Table 2: Frankel-Wei Estimates by Country 
 




  Mal 1  Mal 2  Pak 1  Pak 2  Phil 1  Phil 2  Sing 1  Sing 2  Sri L 1  Sri L 2 







































































































2  0.65  0.82  0.64  0.89  0.39  0.39  0.30  0.35  0.62  0.56 
DW  1.84  1.94  1.61  1.92  2.11  2.04  2.03  2.08  1.66  1.61 























   
  Bang 1  Bang 2  China 1  China 2  Indon 1  Indon 2  India 1  India 2  Korea 1   Korea 2 







































































































2  0.70  0.61  0.96  0.96  0.77  0.76  0.63  0.68  0.13  0.28 
DW  1.69  1.63  2.32  2.18  2.40  2.44  2.13  2.00  1.89  1.79 
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Table 2 cont’d 
  Taiwan 1  Taiwan 2  Thail 1  Thail 2  Viet 1  Viet 2 































































2  0.52  0.53  0.36  0.38  0.67  0.66 
DW  1.45  1.49  1.87  1.93  2.09  2.12 













Note: Includes lagged dependant variable.  Figures in parentheses are p-values and those parameters 
significant at 10 percent or better are in bold. Sample is 1999m1 to 2009m9 for the first estimates for each 
country and to 2007m12 for the second set.  Any deviation from the full sample reflects the availability of 
data at the time of its acquisition.  A one month lag dependent variable is included in all regressions and a 
one month lag term for the US dollar per SDR is included for China, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Sri Lanka Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam if its inclusion helps to reduce serial correlation. 
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Table 3: Frankel Wei Estimates by Regime Type 
Fixed Effects OLS by Regime Type 
 
(Dependent Variable: Local currency per SDR) 



































































R-sq  0.16  0.56  0.30  0.71  0.14 
DW  2.09  1.95  2.00  1.89  2.01 
Cross-sections 
/ observations 
4/408  8/706  6/604  3/185  2/198 
 
Notes: Includes lagged dependant variable.  Constants not shown. Figures in parentheses are p-values and 
those parameters significant at 10 percent or better are in bold. Sample 1999m1 to 2009m9. Any deviation 
from this reflects the availability of data at the time of its acquisition. 
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Figure 1: Recursive Least Squares Estimates for the US dollar Weight 
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Figure 2: Recursive Least Squares Estimates for the US dollar Weight: 
 
2a: Independent Floaters 
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